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The Effect of Local Area Unemployment on
Compensating Wage Differentials for
Injury Risk
Keith A. Bender* and Hosne Mridha{
Compensating wage differential (CWD) theory assumes that workers can always find a job
without undesired characteristics, which forces firms with disamenities to pay a CWD.
However, a simple theoretical variation of standard CWD theory shows that if there is a
probability of job loss due to involuntary unemployment, the CWD is lower. When this
probability is proxied by local unemployment rates, we find a downward bias in typical
estimated CWDs using cross-sectional data that span many local labor markets. Estimates from
the Current Population Survey data show that the bias can be quite large, which in turn impacts
the implicit value of injury estimates.
JEL Classification: J28, J17, J64
1. Introduction
The theory of compensating differentials, as formally described by Rosen (1986) and
others, assumes that workers can easily find jobs without undesirable characteristics. With the
ease of movement between ‘‘clean’’ and ‘‘dirty’’ jobs, for example, workers will have the
incentive to take dirty jobs only when there is a high enough wage premium above the wages for
clean jobs to compensate them for the disutility of being in a dirty job. However, labor markets
are often in flux, making it sometimes difficult to find jobs, thus generating unemployment.
This unemployment can be thought of as impacting the compensating wage differential (CWD)
through one of two related pathways. First, firms might exploit increased monopsony power in
nonclearing labor markets. The theory of CWD assumes that it is costly to reduce a disamenity,
and so firms will avoid, for example, offering a CWD or cleaner jobs if they can. Alternatively,
the effect could be explained by looking at worker behavior. If unemployment is involuntary,
the expected utility of workers will decrease because there is a chance that they will be
unemployed and have lower utility than if they were employed. With this new (and lower)
expected utility from being in the labor market, the CWD locus should shift downward. Indeed,
if the level of joblessness in labor markets is high, then it is not clear that measured differences
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in the wages of clean and dirty jobs accurately describe the true compensating differential for
that disamenity. This might be particularly problematic in cross-sectional studies where the
unemployment rates in local labor markets across a country might vary substantially.
The fact that unemployment rates are included in studies of CWD is not new. However,
the intuitive story given above indicates that there may be a relationship between a CWD and
the health of the labor market. Indeed, it is the attempt to isolate this interaction that is the
innovation of this article. Using cross-sectional U.S. data on the injury riskiness of jobs and
unemployment in metropolitan areas, this study finds that there are strong downward biases in
the estimated CWD in metropolitan areas with high levels of unemployment, particularly for
males and nonunion workers. These results are robust to a variety of econometric and variable
specifications. Finally, the bias is found to affect the value of injury estimates as well. For
example, the value of an injury using the standard methodology is less than half than the value
of estimates controlling for local unemployment rates. These results indicate that when using
cross-sectional data it is important to take into account the level of local unemployment rates,
as unemployment impacts the observable compensating wage differential.
2. Related Literature
The literature on compensating differentials for risk is very large, and it is beyond the
scope of this article to review this literature (for two comprehensive reviews, see Viscusi 1993
and Viscusi and Aldy 2003). In general, the main intuition of compensating differential theory,
which has been around for at least as early as the 18th-century writings of Adam Smith, is
agreed on. In order to induce workers to take a job with an unpleasant characteristic, the firm
needs to pay more, ceteris paribus. To find out how much wages need to increase to compensate
for the disamenity, hedonic wage regressions are estimated, controlling for the disamenity as
well as other variables that determine wages. The estimated relationship between the disamenity
and wages is an estimate of the CWD.
Unfortunately, estimates of CWDs are not particularly robust, often finding negative
relationships between the disamenity and wages (that is, jobs with disamenities have lower
wages). Many reasons have been given for this: mismeasurement of the disamenity,
mismeasurement of wages, endogeneity of wages and the disamenity, differing preferences
for the disamenity, and even an invalidation of neoclassical models of the labor market, among
others. However, the literature has not yet focused on one of the basic assumptions of the
theory of CWD, namely, that firms are forced to pay a CWD because the labor market is
working efficiently. If firms do not pay more for a disamenity, then a tight labor market will
guarantee that workers will take a job with an employer that does not have the disamenity. On
the other hand, if the labor market is not tight, the market discipline will not be there to force
firms to pay more to workers for the disamenity, and workers will have no choice but to take a
job (or be unemployed). Empirically, this problem will be most pronounced in cross-sectional
data where workers are spread across (potentially many) different local labor markets, which
vary in their ability to clear.
Although this issue is detailed below, the implication of this is that some measure of labor
market tightness should be included in estimates of CWDs. Obviously one such proxy is the
unemployment rate. There have been a series of articles that have put unemployment in their
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hedonic wage equations. However, the focus of these articles has been on finding a
compensating differential for job insecurity. The intuitive explanation in this case is that in
order to induce workers to jobs in which there is little job security, employers of these jobs will
pay more, ceteris paribus; this has been the focus of many articles, such as Todaro (1969),
Harris and Todaro (1970), Hutchens (1983), Abowd and Ashenfelter (1984), Topel (1984),
Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990), Hatton and Williamson (1991), Winter-Ebmer (2001), Assad
and Tunali (2002), and Averett, Bodenhorn, and Staisiunas (2005), as well as others. They are
similar in that they generally include the industry and/or occupation unemployment rate as a
regressor in the hedonic wage regression (although Hamermesh and Wolfe, 1990, focus on the
duration of unemployment). Indeed, in meta-analyses of CWD for injury and fatality risk,
Mrozek and Taylor (2002) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003) also include the unemployment rate as
a regressor. It is unclear whether they do this to capture a CWD for risk (as the above
referenced articles attempt to do) or to control for local labor market effects. However, it is
clear that none of these articles have an explicit discussion that the unemployment rate will
affect the CWD for other types of disamenities.
There are several articles that are more closely related to this article in that they indicate
that unemployment could play a role in the compensating differential for injury, though none
empirically test what the impact of unemployment on estimated compensating differentials
would be. First, although they do not explicitly address unemployment, Dorman and Hagstrom
(1998) find that noncompetitive labor markets (proxied by union bargaining and discrimina-
tion) tend to diminish compensating differentials for dangerous work. Purse (2004) states that
nonclearing labor markets will diminish the compensating differential for risk, although Purse
does not directly test for whether this is true or how large the bias might be. Lang and
Majumdar (2004) offer an interesting theoretical model that allows for search frictions and
derives conditions where salary may not be tied to disamenities for jobs.
The most closely related article is Hamermesh and Wolfe (1990), who also investigate the
interactions between unemployment and injury risk. However, their article differs from the
current article in two important aspects. First, the theoretical motivation for investigating the
linkage is different, because the focus here is on the effect of local labor market conditions (as
proxied by the unemployment rate) on the CWD for injury risk, while Hamermesh and Wolfe
(1990) focus on the fact that it is the duration of the loss of the job due to injury that generates
the true CWD for job insecurity, although that amount differs depending on whether or not the
unemployment is cyclical. Second, the empirical test of the theory differs. Hamermesh and
Wolfe (1990) include unemployment incidence and duration at the industry level with no
interactions with injury risk, while the current article examines the effect of local
unemployment at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level allowing for interactions with
injury risk as detailed in the next section.
3. The Effect of Unemployment on Compensating Differentials for Injury Risk
A Simple Theoretical Framework
The theory of compensating differentials and tests to estimate it in the context of
compensation for injury risk assume that the labor market clears, that is, that there is relatively
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little unemployment. This section discusses a simple example to show that if there is
unemployment in the labor market (that is, some positive probability that people in the labor
force will have no job), this can adversely affect the compensating differential for risk and cause
it to be lower than what the standard model of compensating differentials would indicate.
We could model this from either the firm or worker standpoint. As mentioned above, one
way that the CWD for injury risk can be forced down is that when involuntary unemployment
increases, monopsonistic power by firms could increase. If this is the case, then it might be
useful to model the effects from the firm’s point of view. However, as Manning (2003, chapter
9) indicates, involuntary unemployment and monopsony need not be related, namely, that one
could have involuntary unemployment even when there is no monopsony. Therefore, since
what is really driving this reduction in the CWD is the lower utility that is associated with
involuntary unemployment, the more general way to analyze this issue is from the worker’s
point of view.1
Thus, we follow the standard worker preferences model outlined in Viscusi and Aldy
(2003). For a von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility model with state-dependent utility
functions, we define three utility functions. First, U(w) is the utility of a healthy worker with
wage w. Second, V(w) is the utility of an unhealthy worker (i.e., one that has been injured).
Similar to Viscusi and Aldy (2003), we assume that workers’ compensation in the case of an
injury is a function of the wage, making V(?) a function of the wage. Third, we define utility
while not working (i.e., unemployment) as B(w). As with V(?), we also assume B(?) is a
function of the wage (perhaps because of unemployment benefits tied to wages or
accumulated savings or welfare payments that are tied to the wage level in the economy).
Intuitively it makes sense to assume that healthy work is preferred to injured work
(U(w).V(w)) and that the expected utility of work is greater than the utility given in
unemployment, that is, (12p)U(w)+pV(w).B(w) for a given w (otherwise people would be
voluntarily unemployed). Finally, the marginal utility of income is positive in all three states,
such that U9(w).0, V9(w).0, and B9(w).0.
Before evaluating the model, a few comments need to be made about how unemployment
is viewed in this particular model. The assumptions imply that unemployment is exogenously
determined and involuntary with the implication that it is better to be employed than
unemployed. This is certainly the driving consideration of the literature that focuses on
compensating differentials for job insecurity as proxied by industry or occupation
unemployment rates discussed above. If the prospect of unemployment did not generate lower
utility, then no compensating differential would need to be paid. Therefore, we are simply
relying on this previous literature for guidance on how to interpret unemployment.2
On the other hand, while unemployment is modeled as a state where utility is lower, the
effect of unemployment is different here than in the literature on job insecurity. In that
literature, for a given health of the local labor market, firms with a relatively high level of job
insecurity (i.e., high industry or occupation unemployment) will have to pay a compensating
1 Of course, if there is some monopsony power by firms, then the CWD will be even lower. Unfortunately, we cannot
distinguish between the effect of monopsony and involuntary unemployment on lowering the CWD in high
unemployment areas.
2 Obviously, this is not the only interpretation of unemployment, since there are theoretical models of equilibrium
unemployment. Intuitively, in this case, firms are still required to pay a compensating differential for risk because, if
they do not, then workers will voluntarily be unemployed, and so there would be no interaction between
unemployment and CWD for injury risk as implied by Equation 6 and by the coefficient, b4, in Equation 8.
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differential for that relatively high insecurity. Conversely, we are trying to measure what
happens when there are changes in the local labor market—that is, when the unemployment
rate increases for all individuals. In that case, firms in general do not need to pay a
compensating differential. This is modeled by having B(w) lower than the expected utility of
work.
A standard analysis of compensating differentials with no unemployment focuses on
determining the relationship between wages and the risk of an injury (denoted by p) that
maximizes expected utility. When there are tangencies between the expected utility of workers
and expected profits by firm, the locus of all such tangencies generates the market wage-risk
tradeoff, denoted w(p) in Figure 1. As Viscusi and Aldy (2003, p. 8) show, for each worker,
all wage-risk combinations for each level of expected utility Z must satisfy the following
equation:
Z~ 1{pð ÞU wð ÞzpV wð Þ: ð1Þ
The tradeoff between risk and wages for a given level of expected utility (i.e., the indifference
curve) is given by the expression
dw
dp
~{
Zp
Zw
~
U(w){V (w)
(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)
w0: ð2Þ
The implication of this is that for an increase in risk p, there must be a corresponding
increase in wages to make an individual as well off.
With the introduction of involuntary unemployment, however, this relationship is
weakened. In addition to the framework above, assume that there is some probability u that a
person will not get a job, that is, be involuntarily unemployed. In this case, expected utility Zu
becomes
Zu~ 1{uð Þ 1{pð ÞU wð ÞzpV wð Þ½ zuB(w): ð3Þ
Note that now for every wage and risk combination, expected utility is lower (a movement from
Figure 1. Compensating Wage Differential Locus without and with Unemployment
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EU1 to EU2 in Figure 1), meaning that workers are likely worse off and firms are likely better
off. The indifference curves in this case are given by
dw
dp
 u
~{
Zup
Zuw
~
(1{u)½U(w){V (w)
(1{u)½(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)zuB’(w)w0: ð4Þ
There are two key relationships to note here. First, there is still a compensating differential
because workers need to be compensated for increased risk (unless u 5 1, when the slope is
zero). Second, while this is the case, as u approaches 1, that is, as the probability of
unemployment increases, the slope of the indifference curve for each wage and risk
combination gets flatter compared to the full employment (u 5 0) case. This can be seen by
differencing Equations 3 and 4, which gives the following expression:
dw
dp
{
dw
dp
 u
~
½U(w){V (w)uB’(w)
½(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)½(1{u)½(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)zuB’(w)w0: ð5Þ
Since this term is positive, the wage-risk tradeoff for each level of risk is lower when
unemployment is present. That is, there will be a reduction in expected utility for each level of
risk, such as a shift from EU1 to EU2 in Figure 1.
However, this is not the only expression of interest from this simple model. We might
expect that the shape of the indifference curve of expected utility will shift as well. If we take the
derivative of Equation 4 with respect to the unemployment rate u we find the following
expression:
dw
dp
 u
du
~
{u½U(w){V (w)
(1{u)½(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)zuB0(w)
{
(1{u)½U(w){V (w)½B’(w){½(1{p)U 0(w)zpV ’(w)
½(1{u)½(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)zuB’(w)2
~
{B(w)
½(1{u)½(1{p)U ’(w)zpV ’(w)zuB’(w)2v0: ð6Þ
Since this derivative is negative, it shows that the slope of the indifference curve at each wage-
risk point decreases as the unemployment rate increases. Since the w(p) locus is tangent to the
indifference curves, then at each level of p, the wu(p) relationship will likely have a smaller slope
than the compensating differential relationship in the standard case.3
3 Technically this does not have to be the case. If the firm’s isoprofit line p1 moves far enough to the right, then the wu(p)
line might be more steeply sloped than the w(p) locus. This would imply that it is very expensive for firms to reduce
injury risk relative to cutting wages, given the large move to the right when profits increase. Although this is possible, it
is not probable, particularly when firms are large, since a reduction of wages would likely be a more important source
for increasing profits. Of course, the effect could be pinned down with more explicit structure on the (iso-) profit
functions of firms, but to keep the model as general as possible, we will not explicitly derive this. Note, however, that
there is no such restriction on the empirical specification below, and so the empirical relationship embodied by b4 in
Equation 8 would be positive if the combination of unemployment and firm reactions cause the compensating
differential line to increase.
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Empirical Implications
Most empirical estimates of w(p) involve a hedonic wage regression that typically takes the
form of
wi~azb1Xizb2Jizb3pizei ð7Þ
where for person i, w is the (log) wage, X is a vector of personal characteristics, J is a vector of
job characteristics, p is a measure of risk (fatal, nonfatal or both),4 e is an iid random error
term, and b1, b2, and b3 are parameter vectors to be estimated. In this formulation, the
coefficient b3 is an estimate of the compensating differential for injury risk. As Viscusi and Aldy
(2003) note, there have been many variations of estimating Equation 7 in the literature. Most
notably there may be interactions between risk and personal characteristics, such as gender,
age, and union status, to allow for differing compensating differentials by these characteristics.
Therefore, estimates of this basic equation (and the one discussed below) will be examined by
these different characteristics of the population.
From Equations 5 and 6, however, we might think that a hedonic regression of Equation 7
would lead to an underestimate of b3, if workers are located in labor markets where the
unemployment rate varies across labor markets (as is likely to be the case in large national
surveys). On the one hand, Equation 5 indicates that unemployment causes a shift effect,
impacting wages directly echoing the previous literature on CWD for job insecurity. However,
the key point of this article is summarized in Equation 6, which implies that the CWD locus
itself depends on the unemployment rate. To correct for this bias, Equations 5 and 6 indicate
that the following variable specification should be implemented:
wi~azb1Xizb2Jizb’3pizb4pi|URizb5URizei, ð8Þ
where UR is the unemployment rate for worker i’s local region. The new coefficient b’3 is now
the unbiased compensating differential, that is, the compensating differential when the
unemployment rate is zero. b4 shows how the compensating differential for risk changes when
unemployment rates increase. From Equation 6, it is expected that b4 should have a negative
sign. It is unclear what the sign of b5 will be. As mentioned above, if the unemployment rate is
proxying for job insecurity, then the sign should be positive. On the other hand, research on the
wage curve from Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) would indicate a negative sign. This view is
primarily motivated by a noncompetitive theory of the labor market such as monopsony power
by firms (similar to the intuition of the model discussed above), so that when unemployment
rates are high, individuals lower their reservation wages, causing the equilibrium wage to fall
with high unemployment. Since the unemployment rate is measured at the MSA level rather
than by industry or occupation unemployment as the CWD for job insecurity literature often
uses, it is more likely to be the latter, but no restrictions are placed on the estimated sign of the
coefficient.
4 In this article we choose to focus on the CWD for nonfatal risk. While including fatal risk would be an interesting
extension, we want to focus on compensating for one type of risk. Obviously there might be a correlation between the
two, but as a recent article by Sandy and Elliott (2005) shows, the inclusion of fatal risk does not change the estimated
CWD for nonfatal illness significantly.
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4. Data
If unemployment affects the measured compensating differential for injury risk, it is most
likely to be identified in data from labor markets that have different levels of unemployment
rates. As it happens, many of the studies that investigate compensating differentials use such
cross-sectional data. Therefore, we follow this convention to examine the role of unemployment
on CWD for risk. Below we detail the data that we employ.
Demographic Data
Individual-level data come from the 1996–2001 March Current Population Survey (CPS).5
Average hourly wage and demographic information are taken from the CPS to form a sample
of workers. We control for a set of regressors standard in the literature: gender, marital status,
veteran status, race, education, region of residence, age, age squared, and indicators for two-
digit occupation, year, and the metropolitan area in which respondents live.
Unemployment Rate Data
A separate sample is taken from the CPS for each of these years that includes both
working and unemployed individuals. From this sample, we calculate the unemployment rates
for the 242 metropolitan areas identified in the CPS in each year. These metropolitan-specific
unemployment rates are then merged with the worker dataset and are used to control for local
labor market conditions. In the initial estimates, therefore, only those who live in one of the
metropolitan areas are included in the sample.
Injury Risk Data
Finally, we merge injury and illness data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) at the
three-digit industry level.6 These data provide an incidence rate of yearly cases of lost workdays
due to injury or illness at the job per 100 full-time workers, by industry. It should be noted that
the CWD literature has found that the use of industry (or occupational) injury rates are subject
to measurement error (see, for example, Sandy et al. 2001 and Black and Kniesner 2003).
Although we could use either or both measures of injury risk, we focus only on the former not
only for the sake of brevity, but also because our focus is to see if ignoring local labor market
conditions affects the CWD for risk. It is unclear that the direction of the bias would be altered
by the measurement error, although the point estimate may be. Ultimately our goal here is to
5 CPS observations which have imputed earnings were deleted from the data used in this study because of the biases
noted in Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) and Bollinger and Hirsch (2006). However, leaving in the imputed earnings
does not change the results appreciably.
6 A complicating issue associated with the use of BLS incidence data is that they are reported at the three-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code, while the March CPS industry codes are based on the detailed Census industry
code. However, the BLS publishes a correspondence between the SIC and the Census code. For the most part, these are
one-to-one correspondences; where there are not, employment by three-digit SIC code was used to weight the incidence
rates to obtain an incidence rate for the Census code. The only worker group excluded from the merged data set is
individuals employed in public administration. Their exclusion arises because the BLS does not report risk information
for this group of workers.
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use a very standard CWD empirical specification to see if there is evidence of the theoretical
prediction.
After dropping missing values of the variables and those who do not live in a metropolitan
area, the sample of workers comprises of 42,429 individuals. Descriptive statistics of the sample
and various subsamples are given in Appendix 1.
5. Results
Estimates of Compensating Differentials for Injury Risk
As a first step, we estimate a ‘‘Simple’’ CWD regression, one that does not use any
information on unemployment rates, but one that controls for the set of regressors discussed
above.7 The estimated coefficient on the injury risk variable, reported in the first row of
Table 1, shows that there is a log wage increase of 0.0026 log points (approximately 0.26%)
when the risk rate increases by one unit—a small but statistically significant compensating
differential for risk. The second row reports the estimate of the CWD for risk when the local
unemployment rate is included as a regressor. The coefficient is little changed from a ‘‘Simple’’
specification, while the coefficient on the unemployment rate (the standard measure of job
insecurity) is negative but insignificantly different from zero. The third row of Table 1 presents
estimates of the model suggested by the theoretical model discussed above, namely, one that
interacts risk and unemployment. As expected, the coefficient on this interaction is statistically
significant and negative at 20.0007 (approximately a 0.1% reduction in the hourly wage for
every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate). On the other hand, the estimated
CWD coefficient on risk increases substantially from 0.0026 to 0.0057, showing the large
negative bias on the CWD when the interaction of unemployment rates and injury rates is not
controlled for. The coefficient on the unemployment rate is now positive, but it is still
statistically insignificant.
The literature on CWD has also focused on estimating the CWD by different subgroups of
the population. While there are many comparisons, we focus on three common subgroups:
gender, union/nonunion status, and age. The rest of Table 1 reports the estimated CWD for
each of these groups for both the ‘‘Simple’’ as well as the ‘‘Interacted’’ model.
In the ‘‘Simple’’ model, both males and females have a positive CWD, although only for
males is the coefficient statistically significant. However, when the ‘‘Interacted’’ model is
7 Because of the spatial element introduced by the regional unemployment rates, fixed effects for each metropolitan area
are included in each regression to pick up other specific factors that might impact wages across metropolitan areas
(such as compensating differentials for local disamenities as in Berger, Blomquist, and Peter 2008 and differences in
state laws regarding worker compensation insurance). Selected results are reported in the tables, but full results are
available from the authors. Note that because we have many observations in the same metropolitan area that defines
our unemployment rates, the standard errors may suffer from clustering. However, because we are controlling for a
fixed effect for each metropolitan area and our number of clusters is small relative to the number of observations within
many clusters, we follow Wooldridge (2007, pp. 7–8), who cautions using a cluster-robust correction to standard errors
since it may be ‘‘very conservative when it need not be’’ (p. 8). Indeed, estimates of standard errors clustered on
metropolitan area in the fixed effects model confirm this with almost all t-statistics falling below the threshold for
statistical significance. Therefore, the results below follow the standard inference in fixed effects models. It is important
to note, however, that this issue does not affect the coefficient estimates, which is still an important implication of the
theoretical model.
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estimated for men, the estimated CWD increases substantially from 0.0027 to 0.0082, while the
interacted variable is 20.0013 and also statistically significant. For women, there are similar
qualitative movements in the CWD coefficient and the interaction term is negative, although
neither is statistically significant. Although this does not seem to conform to the theory of
compensating differences, finding insignificant differentials for women is not unusual in the
literature, resulting in many articles focusing on estimating differentials for men only. Various
reasons have been given for this from endogeneity bias to mismeasurement of risk (Hersch
1998).
Table 1. Estimates of CWD by Subsample
Sample Model
Coefficient on
Risk
Risk*Metro
Unemployment Rate
Metro
Unemployment Rate
Full Simple 0.0026***
(3.78)
Simple with
unemployment rate
0.0026** 20.0015
(3.78) (20.69)
Interacted 0.0057*** 20.0007** 0.0031
(3.43) (22.07) (0.98)
Male Simple 0.0027***
(2.88)
Interacted 0.0082*** 20.0013*** 0.0039
(3.58) (22.63) (0.85)
Female Simple 0.0008
(0.86)
Interacted 0.0016 20.0002 0.0018
(0.65) (20.33) (0.42)
Union
members
Simple 0.0046***
(2.91)
Interacted 0.0050* 20.0001 20.0073
(1.27) (20.11) (20.91)
Nonunion Simple 0.0005
(0.74)
Interacted 0.0048*** 20.0010*** 0.0042
(2.66) (22.58) (1.23)
Age: 16–34 Simple 25.10E-6
(20.01)
Interacted 0.0012 20.0003 20.0009
(0.46) (20.51) (20.19)
Age: 35–50 Simple 0.0018*
(1.75)
Interacted 0.0057** 20.0009* 0.0065
(2.18) (21.69) (1.28)
Age: 51+ Simple 0.0087***
(5.25)
Interacted 0.0160*** 20.0017* 0.0096
(3.85) (21.92) (1.22)
The dependent variable is the log of real average wages. Other controls include (when appropriate) gender, marital
status, veteran status, race, education, region of residence, age, age squared, indicators for two-digit occupation and
year, and metropolitan fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using sample weights. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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The next two subsamples of Table 1 present results by union status. There is a relatively
large CWD for risk for union workers at 0.0046, unsurprising given earlier research, such as
Sandy and Elliott (1996), finds strong CWD for union workers. On the other hand, the
estimated CWD for nonunion workers is insignificantly different from zero with a very small
point estimate. When the ‘‘Interacted’’ model is estimated, the CWD for risk for both union
and nonunion workers becomes nearly equal, increasing to 0.0050 for union workers and
0.0048 for nonunion workers. Interestingly, only in the nonunion case is the interaction term
negative and significant (20.0010), perhaps because unions are better able to protect CWDs
obtained for members even in the face of unemployment.8
The last three subsamples on the bottom of Table 1 include results when the sample is split
into three age categories: 16–34, 35–50, and greater than 50 years. In each case the pattern is
similar as in the previous subsamples. The estimates of the CWD are much smaller in the
‘‘Simple’’ model specification, while they are increased in the ‘‘Interacted’’ model, where, as
above, the interacted term is negative (although statistically significant at the 10% level only for
the two older age groups).9
Robustness Checks
Although the estimates reported above lend support to the theoretical model, the literature
on CWD indicates that there are other potential biases that should be addressed to indicate
whether these results are robust to these biases. First among these are corrections for a variety
of econometric factors that might bias the coefficients. Second, we examine if the results are
possibly a result of how we calculate the unemployment rate and offer two robustness checks to
examine if this is a problem.
Endogeneity
A large portion of the CWD literature stresses the importance of the endogenous
relationship between risk, income, and preferences. Since risk is not randomly distributed
across workers, people have a choice about the amount of risk to which they are exposed.
Therefore such things as preferences for risk or increased income (assuming that safety is a
normal good) can impact the amount of risk. The standard correction for this is to estimate a
first-stage regression that estimates the level of risk. Central to this is a list of variables included
in the risk regression but not included in the wage regression. For this list we rely on the
previous literature on CWD and use common instruments: the number of children under six
years and under 18 years, nonrespondent income, net worth of a house, and the percentage of
8 This is interesting in the light that, at least under a neoclassical view of unions, unions generate unemployment by
increasing wages above the market clearing level. However, in the case of CWD for injury and fatality risks, Sandy and
Elliott (1996) and Bender, Mridha, and Peoples (2006) provide some evidence that the union effect on CWD through
union voice can actually be efficient. Alternatively, collective bargaining may cause outcomes that are less responsive to
the market, forcing firms to pay a compensating differential even in the face of unemployment.
9 Interestingly, the coefficient on the unemployment rate is statistically insignificant in each of the ‘‘Interacted’’
specifications. It is not clear why this is, since the theoretical model predicts a negative relationship. However, since the
metropolitan unemployment rate will be correlated with the industry and occupation unemployment rates in the area
(which may proxy for job insecurity and would therefore have a positive influence on wage), the two opposing effects
may be canceling each other out.
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individuals in the industry who are managers and white collar workers.10 Then risk, predicted
from this first stage regression, is used in the place of actual risk to estimate an endogeneity-
corrected CWD.11
Table 2 contains results from this method, reporting the results from the ‘‘Interacted’’
model. For the full and nearly every subsample, there is a positive CWD (although it is only
statistically significant for the oldest age group), and the coefficient on the unemployment rate
is now positive and significant for many of the subsamples. In addition, the coefficient on the
interacted variable continues to be negative and is significant for each subsample, except in the
case of union workers and the middle age group. Standard controls for endogeneity, therefore,
do not seem to be driving the results for the unemployment-risk interaction.12
10 Similar instruments have been used in Garen (1988), Sandy and Elliott (1996), Sandy et al. (2001), and Bender,
Mridha, and Peoples (2006).
11 Garen (1988) offers a variant of this methodology, sometimes used in this literature. The results from using this
methodology do not vary substantially from the more simple results presented here and are available from the
authors.
12 A related form of endogeneity may be the injury rate itself may be affected by the unemployment rate. For example,
Robinson (1988) finds this with manufacturing injury rates, theorizing that the cause is a decline in union bargaining
power. Looking at a correlation between average injury rates in a MSA and the MSA unemployment rate does show a
positive, but small, correlation of 0.16. Ultimately, however, it is not clear if it is that the injury rate in a particular job
has increased or that more people take jobs that have higher than average injury rates because of the bad economy. In
the former case, one would have to model an endogenous injury rate from the firm’s point of view, while the latter case
is one that would be generated by the model discussed in this article.
Table 2. Estimates of CWD Correcting for Endogeneity Using the ‘‘Interacted’’ Model
Sample
Coefficient on
Predicted Risk
Predicted Risk*Metro
Unemployment Rate
Metro
Unemployment Rate
Full 0.0037 20.0019*** 0.0109**
(1.42) (23.62) (2.54)
Male 0.0048 20.0023*** 0.0111*
(1.25) (23.01) (1.71)
Female 0.0002 20.0017** 0.0110*
(0.05) (22.23) (1.92)
Union members 0.0093 20.0002 20.0091
(1.27) (20.12) (20.85)
Nonunion 0.0028 20.0022*** 0.0120***
(1.00) (23.90) (2.63)
Age: 16–34 0.0065 20.0018** 0.0088
(1.61) (22.19) (1.33)
Age: 35–50 20.0057 20.0013 0.0093
(21.41) (21.63) (1.40)
Age: 51+ 0.0172** 20.0040*** 0.0240**
(2.50) (22.91) (2.34)
The dependent variable is the log of real average wages. Other controls include (when appropriate) gender, marital
status, veteran status, race, education, region of residence, age, age squared, indicators for two-digit occupation and
year, and metropolitan fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using sample weights. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. Risk variables are predicted from a first-stage regression that also controls for number of children under 6 years
and under 18 years, nonrespondent income, net worth of house, and percentage of individuals in industry who are
managers and who are white-collar workers. First-stage regression results are available from the authors. Standard
errors are corrected for generated regressors and robust to heteroskedasticity.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Unemployment Sample Selection
Another important form of bias could be the potential that the sample of workers used
here is nonrandomly different than the unemployed population, leading to a sample selectivity
bias. Our main concern is not so much with the coefficient on the risk variable but with the
coefficient on the interaction since that depends upon the unemployment rate. If
unemployment sample selection is important, then the bias might be seen most in this
interaction variable. We correct for this using the standard maximum likelihood Heckman
(1979) correction for sample selectivity. In this empirical methodology, there is a simultaneous
equation estimation where one equation is the wage regression and the other regression is the
‘‘worker’’ sample selection regression, which includes workers and the unemployed. The
selection regression includes all variables from the wage regression (except for occupation since
the unemployed are not currently working) as well as the number of children under 6 and under
18 and household nonwage income as instruments.13
The results of this exercise are contained in Table 3. In general the results are little
different than those presented in Tables 1 and 2. There are still a strong positive estimated
CWD for injury risk, particularly for the full, male, nonunion, and middle and older age
groups, and the coefficient on the unemployment rate is generally positive and statistically
significant. The interaction term of risk and unemployment rate, however, remains negative
and statistically significant for most of the samples, particularly for males, females (endogeneity
corrected), nonunion workers, and younger and older workers (endogeneity corrected), and the
middle age workers, even after controlling for unemployment sample selection.
Alternative Methods of Calculating Unemployment Rates
Central to this study is the calculation of the unemployment rate. The results above use
CPS data on labor force attachment in MSAs to calculate a MSA-specific unemployment rate
that is recorded for each CPS worker in that MSA. Here we examine whether this method is
robust by reporting results using different methodologies to calculate and apply unemployment
rates to workers.
First, there may be mismeasurement of unemployment rates for ‘‘small’’ MSAs.
Indeed, some MSAs have less than 50 observations in our sample of the CPS, which could
generate large variation in measured unemployment rates that is spurious. Therefore as a
robustness check we take the largest 51 MSAs14 (as defined in our sample) and re-estimate
the log wage regressions. Table 4 contains these results. As can be seen, the general pattern
of the results does not change from before. In general, there is a positive and statistically
significant CWD and coefficient on the MSA unemployment rate for the same subsamples
and econometric specifications as above. Likewise, the coefficient on the interacted variable
continues to be negative and statistically significant for each sample, except for women and
union workers.
13 While strictly not needed in the maximum likelihood Heckman correction (because of the nonlinearity of the
correction), instruments help in the correction of sample selection. These latter variables are excluded since they are
assumed to affect the unemployment status of individuals but not wages.
14 These are the largest as defined in our sample. There are at least 244 observations for each MSA—up to a maximum of
1790. The overall sample, however, has been reduced to 26,167 compared to 42,249 when all MSAs are included.
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The second issue involves the sample used. The theoretical model above should apply
for any worker, not just those in a MSA. That is, local labor market conditions may affect
the CWD for urban as well as rural workers. However, although the MSA unemployment
rate is likely a relatively good proxy for the labor market conditions in a MSA, it is not
clear how to derive the local unemployment rate for rural workers in the CPS. One
Table 3. Estimates of CWD by Subsamples, Correcting for Unemployment Sample Selectivity
Sample Model
Coefficient on
Risk
Risk*Metro
Unemployment Rate
Metro
Unemployment
Rate
Full Interacted 0.0058*** 20.0007** 0.0032
(3.52) (22.15) (1.02)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0038 20.0020*** 0.0115***
(1.50) (24.07) (2.95)
Male Interacted 0.0083*** 20.0013*** 0.0040
(3.63) (22.68) (0.88)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0045 20.0023*** 0.0113*
(1.26) (23.26) (1.94)
Female Interacted 0.0017 20.0002 0.0019
(0.72) (20.40) (0.44)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0004 20.0019*** 0.0120**
(0.12) (22.64) (2.26)
Union members Interacted 0.0053 20.0001 20.0070
(1.38) (20.19) (20.90)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0098 0.0001 20.0091
(1.43) (0.11) (20.90)
Nonunion Interacted 0.0049*** 20.0010*** 0.0043
(2.74) (22.66) (1.27)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0028 20.0024*** 0.0128***
(1.06) (24.36) (3.08)
Age: 16–34# Interacted 0.0026 20.0006 0.0050
(1.05) (21.11) (1.05)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0085** 20.0024*** 0.0166***
(2.27) (23.18) (2.81)
Age: 35–50 Interacted 0.0057** 20.0009* 0.0065
(2.22) (21.66) (1.30)
Endogeneity
corrected
20.0062 20.0014* 0.0098
(21.57) (21.81) (1.59)
Age: 51+# Interacted 0.0093** 20.0006 20.0006
(2.23) (20.71) (20.08)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0150** 20.0043*** 0.0222**
(2.29) (23.19) (2.18)
The dependent variable is the log of real average wages. Other controls include (when appropriate) gender, marital
status, veteran status, race, education, region of residence, age, age squared, indicators for two-digit occupation and
year, and metropolitan fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using sample weights. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. Controls for unemployment sample selection using the Heckman (1979) selectivity correction, where the
variables included in the selection equation are indicators for the number of children and other household income.
Maximum likelihood estimates are reported, except in the subsamples indicated by ‘‘#’’ where the maximum likelihood
estimator did not converge and the Heckman ‘‘twostep’’ estimator was employed. Full results are available upon request.
Tests for the independence of the selection and wage equations are rejected for the full, male, female, union, and
nonunion samples with chi-squared statistics ranging from 6 to 10.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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potential way is to calculate the state unemployment rate and apply that to anyone outside
of a MSA.15 Although this will most assuredly not be equal to the local labor market
conditions facing rural workers, it does give a sense of the overall health of the state level
labor market. Estimates using this sample and methodology are found in Table 5. Again,
Table 4. Estimates of CWD by Subsample and Model for Largest 51 Metropolitan Areas
Sample Model
Coefficient on
Risk
Risk*Metro
Unemployment Rate
Metro
Unemployment
Rate
Full Interacted 0.0119*** 20.0021*** 0.0231***
(4.35) (23.58) (4.14)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0114*** 20.0038*** 0.0339***
(2.63) (24.24) (4.61)
Male Interacted 0.0175*** 20.0036*** 0.0328***
(4.62) (24.45) (4.12)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0149** 20.0052*** 0.0439
(2.42) (24.09) (4.06)
Female Interacted 0.0026 20.0001 0.0119
(0.65) (20.16) (1.54)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0024 20.0019 0.0220**
(0.39) (21.49) (2.20)
Union members Interacted 0.0146** 20.0020 0.0066
(2.42) (21.60) (0.51)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0272** 20.0034 0.0149
(2.50) (21.63) (0.84)
Nonunion Interacted 0.0096*** 20.0022*** 0.0241***
(3.17) (23.35) (3.96)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0087* 20.0038*** 0.0341***
(1.86) (23.86) (4.28)
Age: 16–34 Interacted 0.0058 20.0013 0.0210**
(1.38) (21.51) (2.45)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0106 20.0030** 0.0314***
(1.58) (22.17) (2.80)
Age: 35–50 Interacted 0.0111*** 20.0022** 0.0198**
(2.67) (22.45) (2.33)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0019 20.0033** 0.0264**
(0.30) (22.43) (2.36)
Age: 51+ Interacted 0.0251*** 20.0032** 0.0371***
(3.59) (22.07) (2.61)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0333*** 20.0071*** 0.0615***
(2.85) (22.91) (3.23)
The dependent variable is the log of real average wages. Other controls include (when appropriate) gender, marital
status, veteran status, race, education, region of residence, age, age squared, indicators for two-digit occupation and
year, and metropolitan fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using sample weights. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. Standard errors for endogeneity-corrected results are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
15 By including rural workers, the sample now increases to 67,702 respondents. We also tried an alternative specification
of the rural unemployment rate as the unemployment rate for the state not including people who live in a metropolitan
area. The results from this specification are similar to Table 5.
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the same results hold—generally a positive CWD, but a negative coefficient on the
interacted variable.16
6. An Application: The Impact on Calculating Implicit Values of Injuries
An application of the model concerns the use of the CWD estimates in calculating the
implicit value of an injury (see Viscusi and Aldy 2003 for a survey of U.S. and international
studies). The methodology to calculate the implicit value of an injury is given by the following
formula:
VoI~100|
L( ln w)
LR
|w|2000, ð9Þ
where h(ln w)/hR is the estimated CWD and w is the average wage. This gives the value of
changing the rate by one unit, and so to reduce the probability of injury completely for the
average person, this needs to be multiplied by the average risk rate.17 The important change
here compared to the earlier literature is that h(ln w)/hR may vary with the unemployment rate,
as the ‘‘Interacted’’ model would indicate.
Table 6 reports the implicit values of an injury (VoI) based on different samples and
specifications. For the full sample under the ‘‘Simple’’ specification, the VoI (in 2001 dollars) is
$52,164.18 However, when the ‘‘Interacted’’ model is estimated and the unemployment rate is
constrained to be zero (that is, assuming there is no effect of unemployment on the
compensating differential), the VoI increases substantially to $114,360, showing that not
controlling for unemployment underestimates the VoI quite substantially.
The pattern for the full sample is repeated for every subsample and specification, where
not controlling for risk-unemployment rate interactions causes an underestimate of the VoI
evaluated at the extreme case of zero unemployment. The simple VoI for males and females are
$64,907 and $12,831, respectively, while the ‘‘Interacted’’ model (where the unemployment rate
is set to zero) gives a VoI of $197,125 and $25,413, respectively. For union and nonunion
workers, there is also an increase in the VoI, increasing from $122,671 and $133,338 for union
workers and $9462 to $90,835 for nonunion workers. Finally in each age category the VoI
increases: from 2$84 to $19,735 for the 16–34 age group, from $40,935 to $129,627 for the 35–
50 age group, and from $188,251 to $346,208 for the 51+ age group.
However, it is not clear that zero is the most appropriate value for the unemployment rate,
and certainly it is not realistic. Using the sample average unemployment rate of 4.4% (which is
16 As a further robustness check, a series of regressions were also estimated to control for job insecurity. In previous
research, job insecurity is generally proxied by the unemployment rate in an industry or occupation. Including
unemployment rates recorded at the three-digit industry or occupation level does not affect the CWD and interaction
coefficients by any appreciable amount. Results are available in an appendix available from the authors.
17 Given that different samples are used, the sample specific average wage and injury rates are used in this calculation.
These averages are given in the notes of Table 6. This is in the spirit of Leeth and Ruser (2003) who use a similar, but
more detailed, methodology.
18 The VoI for the full sample falls into the range (between $20,000 and $70,000) that Viscusi and Aldy (2003, p. 35 and
Table 5) report, although there are quite a few studies that find VoI estimates over $100,000, indicating a fairly wide
variation in estimates. The wide variation here for the subsamples is primarily because of the different estimates of the
CWD but is also due to differences in average wages and injury rates. So, for example, the high VoI for union workers
is a combination of having the highest CWD, average wage, and injury rate.
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close to the estimated nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment [NAIRU] for the late
1990s and early 2000s according to Ball and Mankiw 2002 and Clemente, Lanaspa, and
Montan˜e´s 2005, although the latter article finds a good deal of dispersion of the NAIRU across
states) we find in the final row of each subsample that the VoI adjusted for this average
unemployment rate is fairly close to the VoI that comes from the ‘‘Simple’’ model. So, for
example, the VoI drops to $59,618 for men and $11,548 for women. This pattern of being
within a couple hundred dollars of the ‘‘Simple’’ model estimates is repeated for each
subsample.
Table 5. Estimates of CWD by Subsamples, Including Workers Not in an MSA
Sample Model
Coefficient on
Risk
Risk*Metro
Unemployment Rate
Metro
Unemployment Rate
Full Interacted 0.0070*** 20.0010*** 0.0086***
(5.00) (23.32) (3.11)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0063*** 20.0021*** 0.0154***
(2.77) (24.43) (4.06)
Male Interacted 0.0085*** 20.0014*** 0.0078*
(3.91) (23.03) (1.81)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0043 20.0023*** 0.0141**
(1.21) (23.25) (2.35)
Female Interacted 0.0020 20.0003 0.0061
(0.88) (20.62) (1.50)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0020 20.0019*** 0.0155***
(0.56) (22.67) (2.92)
Union members Interacted 0.0084** 20.0005 20.0081
(2.23) (20.74) (21.06)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0111 20.0005 20.0091
(1.64) (20.38) (20.92)
Nonunion Interacted 0.0049*** 20.0010*** 0.0091***
(2.87) (22.88) (2.83)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0033 20.0022*** 0.0164
(1.26) (24.16) (3.85)
Age: 16–34 Interacted 0.0013 20.0003 0.0027
(0.55) (20.67) (0.59)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0049 20.0016** 0.0111*
(1.33) (22.20) (1.80)
Age: 35–50 Interacted 0.0054** 20.0009* 0.0095**
(2.21) (21.67) (2.00)
Endogeneity
corrected
20.0037 20.0016** 0.0138**
(20.98) (22.06) (2.24)
Age: 51+ Interacted 0.0178*** 20.0020** 0.0156**
(4.64) (22.55) (2.17)
Endogeneity
corrected
0.0175*** 20.0039** 0.0270***
(2.85) (23.27) (2.91)
The dependent variable is the log of real average wages. Other controls include (when appropriate) gender, marital
status, veteran status, race, education, region of residence, age, age squared, indicators for two-digit occupation and
year, and metropolitan fixed effects. Regressions are weighted using sample weights. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics. Workers not in a MSA are given the unemployment rate for the state in which they live. Standard errors for
endogeneity corrected results are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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This might cast some doubt about whether the methodology described here is actually
worth doing if the ultimate aim was to calculate an average VoI. However, the importance of
the bias in the VoI comes in when the unemployment rate is significantly above this average
(i.e., above the NAIRU for this time period). The easiest way to see this is to use the interaction
term to indicate how much the estimated VoI falls for a one percentage point increase in the
unemployment rate. For example, for the full sample, the estimated VoI falls by $14,044 for
each percentage point the local unemployment rate increases, meaning that an unemployment
rate of 8.14% reduces the VoI to zero. This is the case for approximately 4.9% of the sample
who reside in areas with unemployment rates above that threshold. The reduction in the VoI
for the subsamples ranges from $3208 for females to $31,251 for males, is greater for nonunion
workers, and is increasing with age. These reductions mean that the VoI is eliminated when the
unemployment rate ranges from 4% (for the 16–34 age group) to 9.41% (for workers over age
50).19
Table 6. Estimates of Implicit Value of Injury
Sample Model
Implicit Value of
Injury (VoI)
Change in VoI for a
One-Point Increase in the UR
Full Simple $52,164
Interacted (UR 5 0) 114,360 $ 214,044
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 52,566
Male Simple 64,907
Interacted (UR 5 0) 197,125 231,251
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 59,618
Female Simple 12,831
Interacted (UR 5 0) 25,661 23208
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 11,548
Union members Simple 122,671
Interacted (UR 5 0) 133,338 22667
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 121,604
Nonunion Simple 9462
Interacted (UR 5 0) 90,835 218,924
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 7570
Age 16–34 Simple 284
Interacted (UR 5 0) 19,735 24934
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 21973
Age 35–50 Simple 40,935
Interacted (UR 5 0) 129,627 220,467
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 39,570
Age 51+ Simple 188,251
Interacted (UR 5 0) 346,208 236,785
Interacted (UR 5 4.4) 184,356
Value of injury and change in VoI based on the CWD estimates in Table 1. Average real hourly wage data for full,
male, female, union, nonunion, age 16–34, age 35–50, and age 51+ samples are $16.18, $17.94, $14.32, $18.78, $15.77,
$13.48, $18.34, and $17.45, respectively. The mean risk rates are 6.2, 6.7, 5.6, 7.1, 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.2, respectively.
19 For union workers the unemployment rate needs to reach over 50%, which is clearly unrealistic, but as mentioned
above, collective bargaining may cause wages not to be tied closely to CWD or unemployment rates very closely.
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7. Conclusions and Future Work
The theory of compensating wage differentials is one that makes intuitive sense, but the
implications of the theory depend crucially on an efficiently functioning labor market. Indeed, a
simple model is developed to show that when labor markets are not operating efficiently, firms
are no longer forced to offer as high of a compensating differential for disamenities and that the
CWD will, therefore, be smaller in less efficient markets. This implies that estimating the CWD
for a disamenity using cross-sectional data will cause a downward bias in the estimate if the cross
sections span labor markets with different efficiency. Using standard data for the estimation of
the CWD for risk, this study shows that the bias is quite large, resulting in a much larger
estimated CWD when an interaction between injury risk and unemployment is taken into
account. An application to the implicit value of an injury is also estimated to show that the bias
can affect these estimates as well.
Future work should focus on whether these relationships found here are also present in
other subsamples of the data and are robust to other types of corrections for endogeneity and
measurement error. In addition, theoretically, the implications of this article will likely hold for
other types of compensating wage differentials. In any labor market where the probability of not
working is relatively large, firms will try to reduce the higher compensating pay for disamenities
in an effort to reduce costs. It would be interesting to see if the reductions in the estimated CWD
because of unemployment occur in similar magnitudes for these other disamenities. It may well be
the case that it is harder to reduce, for example, the CWD for fatal risk than for injury risk.
Appendix 1:
Means of the Variables
Variable
Full
Sample
Male
Sample
Female
Sample
Union
Sample
Nonunion
Sample
Age:
16–34
Age:
35–50
Age:
51+
Real hourly wage $16.18 $17.94 14.32 18.78 15.77 13.48 18.34 17.45
Log hourly wage 2.601 2.705 2.491 2.814 2.567 2.428 2.742 2.673
Injury rate 6.169 6.682 5.623 7.131 6.015 6.105 6.223 6.191
Metro unemployment 4.357 4.360 4.354 4.559 4.325 4.371 4.354 4.335
Male 0.515 1.000 0.000 0.575 0.506 0.522 0.514 0.503
Married 0.567 0.596 0.537 0.646 0.555 0.392 0.685 0.701
Veteran 0.097 0.177 0.012 0.142 0.090 0.039 0.093 0.243
White 0.826 0.843 0.807 0.809 0.828 0.808 0.829 0.860
Black 0.121 0.103 0.141 0.150 0.117 0.135 0.119 0.097
High school diploma 0.294 0.296 0.292 0.342 0.286 0.274 0.298 0.331
Some college 0.301 0.284 0.318 0.293 0.302 0.327 0.295 0.255
Bachelor’s degree 0.201 0.196 0.207 0.158 0.208 0.206 0.213 0.164
Graduate degree 0.093 0.097 0.090 0.128 0.088 0.052 0.116 0.138
Age 38.3 38.2 38.5 42.0 37.7 26.4 42.4 57.3
Age squared 1619.3 1606.9 1632.7 1887.6 1576.5 721.3 1787.9 3320.4
Northeast region 0.204 0.200 0.207 0.271 0.193 0.190 0.214 0.209
North-central region 0.229 0.228 0.229 0.305 0.217 0.224 0.231 0.233
West region 0.234 0.240 0.228 0.252 0.231 0.241 0.235 0.215
Southern region 0.334 0.332 0.336 0.172 0.360 0.345 0.319 0.342
Number of
observations
42,429 21,698 20,731 5959 36,470 16,969 17,666 7794
Source: Sociodemographic data are from the 1996–2001 March CPS (Annual Demographic Survey), excluding
observations with imputed earnings. Averages are weighted using CPS sample weights. Injury risk data are from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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